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N.Y. CONST. art. X1, § 3:
Neither the state not any subdivision thereof shall use
its property or credit or any public money, or authorize
or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid
or maintenance . . . of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction
or any religious denomination, or in which any
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the
legislature may provide for the transportation of
children to and from any school or institution of
learning.
U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no
establishment of religion...

law

respecting an

COURT OF APPEALS
Grumet v. Cuomo'
(decided May 6, 1997)
The New York Court of Appeals adjudicated another dispute in
the continuing saga concerning educational services provided to
disabled children residing in the Village of Kiryas Joel
[hereinafter the "Village"] in Orange County, New York.2 In
order to understand this case and the prior decisions concerning
190 N.Y.2d 57, 681 N.E.2d 340, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1997).
at 63, 681 N.E.2d at 342, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 175.

2 Id.
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it, it is necessary to give some background information
concerning the Village.
The Village of Kiryas Joel is an enclave in Orange County,
New York, entirely populated by members of the Orthodox sect
of Judaism known as Satmar Hasidim.3 The Satmars, who
originate from eastern Europe, were molded into a separate
community by Grande Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum in the early
1900's. 4 After the Holocaust, Rebbe Teitelbaum moved most of
the surviving members of the group to the Williamsburgh section
of Brooklyn, New York. In approximately 1974, the Satmars
purchased the area that is now known as Kiryas Joel.'
The residents of the Village strictly follow the tenets of their
faith.7 The sexes are segregated outside the home, women wear
headcoverings, girls dress modestly and boys and men wear
special garments. 8 Yiddish is the Satmars' primary language.'
The children of the Village are educated in private religious
schools that adhere to the traditions and beliefs of the sect. 0 The
residents of the Village prefer not to assimilate into contemporary
society, a philosophy which perhaps is at the root of the entire
controversy.
The educational system provided by the Satmars, which met the
religious and secular needs of the vast majority of the Village's
children, was unable to meet the needs of the children who
required special education services," since, under federal" and
' Grumet v. Cuomo, 162 Misc. 2d 913, 914-15 n. 2, 617 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622

n.2 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1994).
4 Id.

at 915 n.2, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 622 n.2.

5Id.
6id.

7 Id.

at 915 n.2, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 623 n.2.

8 Id.
9Id.
10 Id.

1 d. (citing Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et
seq. (1990)). The statute states in relevant part that "It is the purpose of this
chapter to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them... a
free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs .

. . ."
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state 3 law, these children are entitled to receive special services
even when enrolled in private schools.'" The Monroe-Woodbury
Central School District, in 1984, began to provide such services
in an annex to one of the sect's religious schools. ts In 1985, as a
result of the Supreme Court decisions in Aguilar v. Felton'6 and
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 7 the school district

discontinued this arrangement. 8
As a result, the children were forced to attend public schools
outside their village, a situation that most of their parents found
less than satisfactory. 19 Expressing serious misgivings about the
children's ability to adjust to being educated in a secular setting,
most of the parents withdrew their children from the public
schools, some even seeking administrative review of this
arrangement20 In response to this problem, the New York
Legislature passed a statute, 1989 N.Y. Laws, chapter 748,1
creating a separate school district for the Village."
13 Id. (citing N.Y.
14 Id. at 916 n.2,

EDUC. LAW, art. 89 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
617 N.Y.S.2d at 623 n.2. (noting such children suffered
from "physical, mental, or emotional disorders.").
11 Id. The Village of Kiryas Joel falls geographically within the boundaries
of the Monroe-Wooodbury Central Schhol District. Id. at 915 n.2, 617
N.Y.S.2d at 662 n.2.
16 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (finding New York City program, which used
federal funds to pay salaries of public school teachers who taught in parochial
schools, violated Establishment Clause).
17 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In Ball, plaintiff taxpayers brought suit against the
School District of Grand Rapids claiming that shared time and community
education programs, that provided classes to nonpublic school children at
taxpayer expense, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Id. at 397. The Supreme Court held that since these programs' principal effect
was the advancement of religion, the Establishment Clause had been violated.

Id.

18

Grumet, 162 Misc. 2d at 915-16 n.2, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 623 n.2.

9 Id.
2

Id.

1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 748 (McKinney 1989). Chapter 748 states in
pertinent part:
The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of
Monroe, Orange county, on the date when this act shall take
effect, shall be and hereby is constituted a separate school
district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel village school
21
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In 1993, taxpayers of the State of New York and association of

school districts challenged chapter 748.3 The New York Court
of Appeals found that the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution24 had been violated by this law.Y5 The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision stating
that the statute was "tantamount to an allocation of political
power" on the basis of religion without requiring any impartiality
by the State.
The present controversy27 ensued after the New York
Legislature, in response to the Supreme Court decision
invalidating Kiryas Joel I, enacted chapters 241 and 279 of the
New York Session Laws of 1994.28 Chapter 279 dissolved the
district and shall have and enjoy all the powers and duties of
a union free school district under the provisions of the
education law.
Id.
2 Id.

' Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District,
81 N.Y.2d 518, 618 N.E.2d 94, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1993).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause states in pertinent part
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...
"

d.

81 N.Y.2d at 523, 618 N.E.2d at 96, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
26 Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) [hereinafter Kiryas Joel I]. Justice O'Connor, in
her concurrence suggested an approach however, that might allow such a law
to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 717 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor noted that:
There is nothing improper about a legislative intention to
accommodate a religious group, so long as it is implemented
through generally applicable legislation.
New York
2

may ...

allow all villages to operate their own school

districts. If it does not want to act so broadly, it may set
forth neutral criteria that a village must meet to have a school
district of its own; and the decision would then be reviewable
by the judiciary.

Id.
Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 681 N.E.2d 340, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173
(1997).
1 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 241 (McKinney 1994). Chapter 241 states in
pertinent part:
27

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/30

4

et al.: Establishment of Religion

1998

ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

1013

Kiryas Joel School District, but allowed the district to function
temporarily under the auspices of the Monroe-Woodbury Central
School District. 9 This temporary arrangement was allowed to
continue until a state court decision implemented the Supreme
Court's suggestion in Kiryas Joel P or the Village's school
district was either merged with or replaced by another school
3
district, whichever occurred first. '
Chapter 24132 allowed this merger or replacement to take place
without the need for legislative intervention. 3 A new subdivision
of Education Law § 15043 allowed a municipality meeting certain
qualifications to form its own school district without involving the
legislature. 35 The law also required a vote by both the residents
of the municipality where the proposed school district is to be
created as well as the trustees or members of the Board of
Any municipality situated wholly within a single central or
union free school district, but whose boundaries are not
coterminous with the boundaries of such school district, may
organize a new union free school district, pursuant to the
provisions of this subdivision, consisting of the entire
territory of such municipality, whenever the educational
interest of the community require it.
Id. See also 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 279 (noting that this legislation was
necessary to provide education to the "handicapped children of Kiryas Joel.").
29 Grumet, 90 N.Y.2d at 66, 681 N.E.2d at 343, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
30 512 U.S. 687, 717 (1994). See note 25.
1 Grumet, 90 N.Y.2d at 66, 681 N.E.2d at 343, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
32 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 1504 (3) (McKinney 1994).
33 Grumet, 90 N.Y.2d at 66, 681 N.E.2d at 343, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
34 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 1504 (3) (a) (McKinney 1994). The statute states in
relevant part that a municipality may establish its own school district pursuant
to chapter 241 providing that the following criteria are met:
(i) Mhe enrollment of the municipality... equals at least
two thousand children, and is no greater than sixty percent of
the enrollment of the existing school district . . . ;(ii) such
new school district would have an actual valuation per total
wealth pupil unit at least equal to the statewide average; and
(ii) the enrollment of the existing school district... equals
at least two thousand children, excluding the residents of
such municipality.
Id.35
id.
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Education of the presently existing school district.3 6 Using the
aforementioned procedures, both the Board of Education of the

Monroe-Woodbury Central School District (by a unanimous vote)
and the residents of the Village (by a wide margin) approved the
creation of a Kiryas Joel School District.37

Plaintiffs in this action brought suit as citizen taxpayers38
claiming that chapter 241 violates both the Establishment Clause
of the United States Constitution3 9 and article XI of the New York
State Constitution. 40
The Supreme Court, Albany County

declared chapter 241 constitutional and dismissed plaintiffs'
complaint.4' The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed

N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1504 (3) (b) (McKinney 1994). The statute states in
relevant part:
No such new school district shall be organized
unless... approved by:
(I) a majority vote of the
residents... [but a majority vote] shall not be required if
creation of the new school district has been approved by a
vote of at least two-thirds ... of the local governing body of
the municipality. . .(ii) a majority vote of the trustees or
members of the boards of education of the existing school
district from which such new school district will be
organized; and (iii) a majority vote of the residents of [the]
existing school district, except that the residents of the
municipality seeking to organize the new school district shall
not be entitled to participate in such vote.
Id.
37 Grumet, 90 N.Y.2d at 67, 681 N.E.2d at 344, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
38 N. Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123 (b) (McKinney 1997).
39
36

U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. Section 3 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he state ...shall [not] use its property ...or any public
money, or... permit either to be used... in aid or
maintenance... of any school.., of learning... under
the
control
or
direction
of
any
religious
denomination... but the legislature may provide for the
transportation of children to and from any school ....
Id. See also Grumet, 90 N.Y.2d at 67, 681 N.E.2d at 344, 659 N.Y.S.2d at
177.
" Grumet, 164 Misc. 2d 644, 655, 625 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1008 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1995) (noting "plaintiffs fail[ed] to raise any factual issues that
would call into question the constitutionality of the challenged statute.").
40
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Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that chapter 241 violates the
Establishment Clause because the "special treatment" given to
the Village is, in essence, an "endorsement of this religious
community."43

The New York Court of Appeals noted that although originally
framed as a limitation on congressional power, the Establishment
Clause, under a Due Process" analysis, also limits the power of
State governments. 45 The court stated that the three part test
delineated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4' 6 designed to measure the
amount of governmental involvement under the Establishment
Clause, would guide their analysis, 47 while noting that the Lemon
criteria are not "fixed rules" that must be "rigidly applied. "4
The court then held that chapter 241 not only violates the
Establishment Clause neutrality principles set forth in the holding
of Kiryas Joel I, but also transgresses the second prong of the
Lemon test. 4
The court noted that neutrality among religions and between
religion and secular purposes is one of the primary principles of
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence." At its most basic level,
Grumet v. Cuomo, 225 A.D.2d 4, 12-13, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565, 570 (3d
Dep't 1996) (noting that chapter 241 "single[ed] out a particular religious
group for favorable treatment.").
43 Grumet, 90 N.Y.2d at 64, 681 N.E.2d at 342, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
44U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ." Id.
45 90 N.Y.2d at 68, 681 N.E.2d at 344, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 177-78 (citing
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
46403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In Lemon, The Supreme Court stated that:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Id.
47 90 N.Y.2d at 68, 681 N.E.2d at 345, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
48
Id.(citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975)).
49 Id. at 69-70, 681 N.E.2d at 345, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
11 Id. (citing Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985);
In re Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 689-91, 673 N.E.2d 98, 106-08,
649 N.Y.S.2d 903, 911-13 (1996)).
4'
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the Establishment Clause does not allow government to pass laws
which assist one religion, assist all religions, or prefer one
religion to another. 5
Statues that make benefits generally
available, notwithstanding the availability of benefits to religious
organizations, tend to survive Establishment Clause challenges."
However, mere compliance with facial neutrality is not
determinative and government action that targets religious
organizations for "distinctive treatment," whether favorable or
unfavorable, may not be protected under an illusion of facial
neutrality. 53 The court noted that when a class formed along
religious lines receives a governmental benefit there is a "telling
index of nonneutral sectarian effect."5" It was reliance on these
very principles that caused the Supreme Court in Kiryas Joel I to
declare the law that created a special school district for the
Village's children unconstitutional even though the law utilized
facially neutral terms in its application. 5
In the present case, the plaintiffs claimed that even though
chapter 241 seemed facially neutral and generally applicable, the
law, because it solely benefited the Village, violated the First
Amendment. 6 The court agreed with that contention since the
Village is the only municipality eligible to create its own school
district under chapter 241, 57 and the mere possibility that other
municipalities might qualify in the future would not be enough to
establish the statute's neutrality and general applicability. 8
Defendants argued that as long as chapter 241's criteria have
legitimate educational purposes, it is irrelevant, for constitutional
purposes, that no other existing municipality could qualify.59
"' Id. (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946)).
52 Id. at 70, 681 N.E.2d at 345, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 178 (citing Kiryas Joel I,
512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994)).
13Id. at 70, 681 N.E.2d at 346, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 179 (citing Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)).
54Id.
55Id. (citing Kiryas Joel 1, 512 U.S. at 702-05).

Id.
57Id. at 70-71, 681 N.E.2d at 346, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
58
id.
59 Id. at 71, 681 N.E.2d at 347, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
56
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The court undertook an analysis of chapter 241's criteria and
found that in several instances, some of the criteria served
identifiable purposes related to legitimate educational concerns.w0
The court noted that requiring a specific amount of students for
both the existing and the new school district would make
reasonably certain that there would be enough students for both
districts to continue their operations. 6'
However, one part of chapter 241 proved extremely
problematic for the court.6 The statute limits the definition of a
"municipality" to "a city, town or village in existence as of the
effective date of this subdivision."" This limitation has the effect
of disallowing any village or town subsequently incorporated
from using the procedure outlined in chapter 241 to form a new
school district." The court noted, therefore, that "[n] o other
group can hereafter do what Kiryas Joel did." Although chapter
241 seems to operate in a generally applicable manner in a
religion-neutral fashion, it had the identical nonneutral effect of
"singling out Kiryas Joel for special treatment" that caused both
the New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court to
declare chapter 748, in Kiryas Joel , unconstitutional.6
Using the three prong test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,6' the court found that the statute violated the
second Lemon prong which makes the state's action invalid if "its
primary effect is to advance or promote religion."
Under the
second prong of the Lemon test, the government may not show
60

Id. at 72, 681 N.E.2d at 347, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
(citing Governor's Program Bill Memorandum on Approval, ch 241,
reprintedin 1994 N.Y. LEG. ANN. 178 (McKinney)).
61 Id.
6

Id.

3Id. (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1504 (3) (g)(McKinney 1994).
4 Id.
l at 72-73, 681 N.E.2d at 347, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 180-81.
61 Id. at 73, 681 N.E.2d at 348, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
1 Id. (citing Kiryas Joel 1, 512 U.S. 687, 703-05 (1994)). In Kiryas Joel I.
the Supreme Court noted that "the religious community of Kiryas Joel did not
receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities
eligible for equal treatment under a [truly] general law." Id. at 703.
67 See supra note 25.
6 90 N.Y.2d at 73-74, 681 N.E.2d at 348, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 181 (citing
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
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favoritism or endorse any particular religion. 9 The court noted
that both the statute's actual effect and its stated purpose must be
examined under Establishment Clause scrutiny.70 Even when
neutral on its face, the challenged statute must not have "the
primary effect of advancing religion. " 71 The inquiry must be
conducted by analyzing the statute in context, not in isolation, to
properly determine if the State has acted to endorse a particular
religious group.'
Applying the preceding principles to the case, the court
concluded that chapter 241 would be perceived as favoring the
residents of the Village.7 3 Even though, the court noted, the New
York State Legislature was acting within its authority in
attempting to cure the "constitutional infirmity of chapter 748,"
such an enactment bestows "an unmistakable 'imprimatur of state
approval"' on the residents of the Village.74
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that chapter 241
demonstrates "impermissible governmental endorsement of this
[Kiryas Joel] religious community" because it effectively singles
out the Village's residents for "special treatment." 75 Since such
"special treatment" violates the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution, the court declined to discuss whether
the statute violates Article XI, section 3 of the New York State
Constitution, 76 perhaps reserving such a decision to a case where
it would be outcome determinative.
Id. at 74, 681 N.E.2d at 348, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 181 (citing Allegheny
County v. Greater Pittsburgh Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989)).
70 Id. (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592).
7'Id. (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988)).
72 Id. at 74-75, 681 N.E.2d at 349, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (citing New York
State School Bds. Ass'n v. Sobol, 79 N.Y.2d 333, 339, 591 N.E.2d 1146,
1150, 582 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (1992). See also Kiryas Joel 1, 512 U.S. 687,
699 (1994) (stating a proper analysis should take into account both the text of
the statute as well as its context).
71Id. at 75, 681 N.E.2d at 349, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
74 Id. at 75-76, 681 N.E.2d at 349, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (quoting Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
75 Id. at 64, 681 N.E.2d at 342, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
76 Id. See supra note 38.
69
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